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ABSTRACT 
In this article, we examine the dynamics of Global Value Chains (GVCs) since the 2000s. Did it 
show a marked expansion up to the Great Recession and did GVCs begin a downturn in the 
2010s? To better understand the evolution of GVCs at the world level, we use very detailed trade 
data for 2000 to 2016, which distinguishes different production stages along the GVC. In 
particular, among intermediate goods, we focus on Parts and Components (P&C) rather than 
semi-finished products since the manufacture of P&C corresponds to activities more embedded in 
GVCs. We control, also, for the global business cycle and price effects using an original 
production stages deflator based on detailed bilateral trade unit-values. This new GVC indicator 
shows moderate growth over the study period with no trend reversal.4 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
Over the period 2000-2016, the share of intermediate goods in world trade in nominal 
terms is fairly well correlated to various Global Value Chain (GVC) indicators based on 
international input-output matrices: a moderate expansion of international fragmentation 
followed by a decline from 2011 onwards. 
However, taking into account price effects (using an original deflator by production stages 
based on very detailed and harmonised bilateral trade unit-values), our results show a 
different evolution: the intermediate trade share in volume is growing at a subdued rate 
between 2000 and 2016. 
Share of intermediate goods in manufacturing world trade 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
Focusing on the manufacture of Parts and Components (P&C), which corresponds to 
activities more embedded in GVCs than other intermediate goods, that is, semi-finished 
products, the same pattern emerges, namely a slight increase in the share of P&C in 
manufacturing world trade in volume. Furthermore, after controlling for the global 
business cycle, there is a modest but steady rise, with no sign of a downturn after the 
Great Recession.  
GVCs are particularly well-developed for electronics, the share of this sector in P&C trade 
being the highest and remaining stable over the period. However, subsectors exhibit 
contrasting developments: P&C trade related to office machinery and computers receded 
while trade in telecommunications equipment, the flagship IT revolution industry, thrived. 
Counts of clients or suppliers by stages of production indicate a higher and growing 
geographical diversity for P&C. 
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Chaînes de valeur mondiales 2000-2016 :  
une croissance modérée et sans rupture  
RÉSUMÉ 
La forte expansion des chaînes de valeur mondiales (CVM) depuis les années 2000 a-t-elle marqué 
le pas avec la Grande Récession pour laisser place à un déclin depuis 2011 ? Cette étude propose 
une analyse de la dynamique des CVM au niveau mondial au cours de la période 2000-2016 à 
partir du commerce en volume de pièces et composants. La correction des effets prix par un 
déflateur basé sur des valeurs unitaires bilatérales harmonisées révèle une croissance modérée des 
CVM depuis 2000. L’indicateur de CVM proposé fluctue avec l’activité économique mondiale. 
 
Mots-clés : chaînes de valeur mondiales, pièces & composants – P&C, commerce en volume, 
produits électroniques 
 
Les Documents de travail reflètent les idées personnelles de leurs auteurs et n'expriment pas nécessairement 
la position de la Banque de France. Ce document est disponible sur publications.banque-france.fr 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
The same product is crafted or can be crafted in a certain way from one people, in a 
different way from a second people, in a yet different way from a third people and so 
on. It crosses five or six borders and is processed five or six times before it reaches the 
hands of a merchant who will sell it nearby or faraway, in his own city or in the other 
hemisphere. Here is muslin that was perhaps woven in Saxony with Manchester yarn 
obtained from a mixture of cottons harvested in Surate in India, in Mobile in the United 
States and in Egypt: it is embroidered in Nancy to be sold in Philadelphia or in Canton 
or in Batavia[Java] after having passed through a warehouse in New York or in Hon-
Kong[sic] or in Singapore. 
M. Chevalier, exposition universelle de Londres en 1851 (p. 498) quoted from Todd D. 
(2017), « 1860 L’autre pays du libre-échange », in L'Histoire mondiale de la France, 
directed by P. Boucheron, éditions du Seuil, p. 497-501.1 
As Michel Chevalier’s statement shows, the world-wide organisation of production is well 
established. However, although not a new phenomenon, international production sharing has 
increased since the 1980s. The 1990s and early 2000s are often considered periods of 
unprecedented development of Global Value Chains (GVCs) and the expansion of GVCs has 
contributed to the boom in world trade. The crucial role of GVCs in the globalization process 
is reflected in the growing academic attention afforded to them.2 Richard Baldwin (2016, 
pp.5-6) underlines that:  
Globalization accelerated again from around 1990, when the ICT revolution radically 
lowered the cost of moving ideas. This launched globalization’s next phase— call it 
the “second unbundling” since it involves the international separation of factories. […] 
As a consequence, the second unbundling— sometimes called the “global value 
chain revolution”— redrew the international boundaries of knowledge. The contours of 
industrial competitiveness are now increasingly defined by the outlines of international 
production networks rather than the boundaries of nations.  
However, questions are being raised about the possibility of a slowdown in the international 
production fragmentation process and its effect on global trade growth during the 2011-2016 
period.3  
Several empirical studies have tried to identify the main factors underlying world trade growth 
evolutions, the rise in world trade during the 1990s and 2000s, and its recent slowdown.4 
                                               
1 Our translation.  
2 A World Trade Report (WTO, 2014) indicates that a Google Scholar search on the phrase “global 
value chains” reveals dramatic growth in the scholarly literature between 1980 and 2013. Appendix 1 
Figure A.1 shows the results of the same Google Scholar search for the period 1980-2017 and reveals 
a similar academic interest in the issue.  
3 The period analysed in this paper is 2000-2016. The slowdown in world trade growth occurred 
between 2011 and 2016. After the Great Recession, world trade growth did not return to its pre-crisis 
level. The latest statistics show a slight increase of 2.5% in 2016 (and a strong rebound of 5.2% in 
2017). Projections for 2018 and 2019 are 4.2% and 4% compared to a growth rate of 3.7% for world 
output for these years (IMF, 2018). 
4 Concerning the global trade slowdown and its determinants, see, e.g., the research contributions in 
the ebook edited by Hoekman (2015). 
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Among the many determinants identified, are cyclical and structural factors, and the 
international fragmentation of production in GVCs is considered to have played a key role in 
world trade dynamics since the 1990s.5 In relation to the recent trade slowdown, the 
repositioning of the Chinese economy in its domestic market6 and declining GVC 
participation7 are regarded as important contributors.8 However, there are several other 
drivers including a weak economic environment with low levels of investment and scant final 
demand in the wake of the Great Recession and the ensuing euro area crisis,9 deceleration 
of the trade liberalization process and increased non-tariff protection measures, smaller 
transportation cost reductions and higher relative demand for non-tradable goods, limited 
trade finance, and so on. 
We are especially interested, in this article, in the dynamics of GVCs since 2000. Did they 
exhibit a marked expansion up to the time of the Great Recession and are GVCs 
experiencing a downturn in the 2010s? To better understand the evolution of GVCs at the 
world level, we use disaggregated trade data, which distinguish different production stages 
along the global value chain, in particular Parts and Components (P&C) and semi-finished 
products. Furthermore, we take account of price effects through the construction of an 
original production stages deflator (based on disaggregated bilateral trade unit-values). To 
better grasp GVC dynamics, global business cycles are controlled for and the evolution of 
GVCs is examined at the sectoral level. We then adopt a different standpoint by using data 
on number of clients by exporter, and number of suppliers by importer (by country and 
product) to provide a set of quantitative information on the geographical diversity along 
GVCs, that is, on the extensive margins. 
We show that the share of intermediate goods in world trade, in nominal terms, is fairly well 
correlated to various GVC indicators, based on International Input-Output (IIO) matrices. A 
moderate rise in the 2000s is followed by a trend reversal after 2011. Intermediate trade 
shares - computed on gross trade flows only - are much less data demanding, provide 
information for a longer time span and can be readily updated, while IIO based measures, 
inter alia, require country level data on value added flows and are published irregularly. 
Another advantage of using this world level GVC indicator is the relative ease of obtaining 
volume calculations. When accounting for price effects, the intermediate trade share shows a 
different evolution: it is growing at a low rate between 2000 and 2016. Similarly, focusing on 
the manufacture of P&C, which includes industries typical of the “second unbundling 
(Baldwin, 2016), and corresponds to activities embedded more deeply in GVCs compared to 
semi-finished products, we observe a slight increase of the P&C’s share in manufacturing 
world trade in volume. Further, if we control for the global business cycle, we find a modest 
rise and no sign of a downturn after the 2008-09 global crisis. Also, these GVC evolutions 
are not the result of a sectoral composition effect and, according to our indicator, there is no 
indication of a recent GVC decline for the main branch groups. Finally, counts of clients or 
suppliers by production stages also indicate higher and growing geographical diversity for 
P&C. 
                                               
5 See Johnson and Noguera (2012, 2017), Haugh et al. (2016) and Timmer et al. (2016). 
6 See Lemoine and Ünal (2017), Gaulier et al. (2016), Gaulier et al. (2015). 
7 See Crozet et al. (2015). 
8 Before the Great Recession, China was central to the expansion of GVCs, as companies 
(particularly foreign owned) demanded large quantities of inputs (P&C – parts and components, etc) 
destined for the production of many consumer goods for export. 
9 See, e.g., IMF (2016, Ch. 2) and Boz et al. (2015), on the role of investment decline and import 
intensity in capital goods and Ollivaud and Schwellnus (2015) on the role of weaker demand in the 
euro area. 
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1. GVCs: concepts and measurement issues 
Both theoretical and empirical studies show that the international segmentation of production 
processes is a major underlying factor in the trade flows between countries. Production steps 
have become fragmented internationally, as firms located in different countries take part in 
the production of a good (or a service), in different stages of the value-added chain (Baldwin, 
2016). Countries specialize in the supply of specific tasks rather than production of the entire 
final good and it is this vertical division of labour that is at the origin of countries’ comparative 
advantage at different stages of the production process leading to a “trade in tasks” 
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). 
Therefore, a GVC involves combining domestic and imported inputs into the production 
processes to manufacture goods and services that are exported for another stage of 
production or incorporated into the final good, which is sold domestically10 or exported. GVC 
expansion can be the result of various factors. The international segmentation of production 
occurs in sectors where the production process can be broken down into technologically 
separate and independent operations, providing intermediate inputs to be assembled into the 
final product (Lassudrie-Duchêne, 1985). Technological progress can, but may not 
necessarily, contribute to the evolution of GVCs. Following Bloom et al. (2009), Baldwin 
(2016) distinguishes the effects of coordination11 and information technologies. While the 
former favours the international fragmentation of production, the latter – for example, 
automation - could enable more onshoring.12 Moreover, trade corresponding to an 
international segmentation of production process is enhanced by the lowering of transport 
and communication costs. Multinational firm strategies inevitably play a key role as 
companies decide to develop sourcing policies relying on foreign and sometimes distant 
suppliers. Offshoring – either through in-house sourcing (within a multinational firm) or 
outsourcing (to independent contractors) – has increased imports of intermediate inputs and, 
as a result, the development of GVCs is at the heart of massive (intra- and inter-firm) trade 
flows of intermediate goods (and services), in particular of P&C (Fontagné, 1991). 
GVCs are an international network of the stages of production and capturing their evolutions 
statistically raises several problems since it requires the tracking of value added through 
supply and use linkages, both between sectors and across borders. Most studies of “vertical 
specialization” (Hummels et al., 2001) draw on global input-output matrices, which are 
difficult to obtain and are published only for limited and recent periods. This limits the 
availability of up-to-date tables over time.13 Moreover, as Johnson (2017) points out, the 
construction of such matrices relies on numerous methodological assumptions: for example, 
in some studies, production destined for different foreign markets or the domestic market of a 
given industry, is assumed to contain the same proportion of foreign input from various 
                                               
10 Depending upon how a GVC is defined, the import of intermediate goods to produce a final good 
that is consumed domestically is included or not. See below. 
11 Coordination technologies are technologies that facilitate any form of transmission. 
12 “Better CT (coordination technologies) favor fractionalization by making it cheaper; better IT 
(information technologies) discourages fractionalization by making it less necessary” (Baldwin, 2016, 
pp. 200-201). 
13 The joint OECD–WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) database provides indicators for the years 
1995 to 2015 with successive editions based on different Systems of National Accounts and industrial 
classifications (latest edition 2018) while the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) covers the period 
2000-2014 (published in 2016). 
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industries.14 This assumption does not hold in the case, for example, of China’s processing 
and ordinary trade flows (Lemoine and Ünal, 2017). 
Another and much simpler way to study the international fragmentation of production at the 
world level is to examine the evolution of the share of intermediate goods in global trade. As 
explained above, a consequence of the international segmentation of production processes 
is a growing share of intermediate products in world trade, in particular P&C. Trade flow 
statistics by production stages, are relatively easy to compute since the data are directly 
available with few constraints on their temporal, sectoral or geographical dimensions. 
Admittedly, trade in intermediate goods does not correspond absolutely to all cross border 
production-sharing activities included in GVCs and is not fully integrated in GVCs. For 
example, at country level, GVC participation indexes usually include both the export’s foreign 
value added as a share of the country’s gross exports, and the domestic content in the 
country’s exports that then is exported by its trading partners (i.e., backward and forward 
engagement in GVCs). According to this definition, not all intermediate goods trade flows are 
embedded in GVCs and, especially, those used for the production of a good destined for the 
domestic market.15 Furthermore, some GVC production stages, such as final assembly 
activities, are not included in intermediate goods trade.  
To measure country level GVC participation or bilateral offshoring,16 the availability of IIO 
tables is a positive development since it provides information on the origins of all value 
added flows imported by a given country. Johnson (2017, p. 6) highlights that IlO matrices 
allow both the possibility of some domestic content in imported inputs and the “multilateral 
nature of GVCs”: bilateral foreign content can indeed “travel indirect routes (via third 
countries) from its source to where it is ultimately used in production”. However, at the global 
                                               
14 More precisely, Johnson (2017, p. 19) discusses two types of problems in the construction of global 
input-output tables: “One problem is that the ‘use table’ in the input-output accounts – which tracks 
how commodities are used as inputs by individual industries – does not distinguish between patterns 
of input use for domestically produced versus imported goods/services. This implies that one must use 
assumptions (or data imputation techniques) to decompose input use across sources. Most 
commonly, imported input use tables are constructed using “proportionality” (alternatively, “import 
comparability”) assumptions, under which imported inputs are allocated across sectors in the same 
proportion as domestic goods. Further, the proportionality assumption is naturally applied to total 
imports, so inputs from all bilateral trade partners are treated in the same way. In plain language, the 
input-output segment of the national accounts do not directly tell us how much imported steel is used 
in US car production, nor whether imported steel from Canada versus Japan are used in the same 
way. A second problem is that imported inputs are assumed to be used with equal intensity in industry-
level production for domestic and export markets. When imported input intensity differs across firms 
within an industry, then using the average input intensity reported in input-output tables to represent 
production techniques may lead to large biases in measurement of the value added content of trade 
and other GVC metrics”. 
15 WTO (2014, p. 80) states that inter-country input-output indicators often make “the assumption that 
the production network is composed of at least three different stages or steps performed sequentially 
in different countries”. The import of intermediate goods to produce a final good that is consumed 
domestically or “direct absorption” is excluded by Borin and Mancini (2017), e.g., in their GVC 
participation index: for these authors a GVC corresponds to at least two international shipments. 
16 To illustrate the measurement difficulties related to bilateral offshoring, Johnson (2017, p. 6) takes 
the example of Mexico and the US: “consider trying to measure Mexican content in US-produced cars, 
and suppose that the US uses imported engines from Mexico. […] First, the US might export inputs 
(e.g., spark plugs) to Mexico that are embodied in Mexican engines. Second, Mexican engines might 
include value-added content from third countries (e.g., steel from China). These higher-order input 
linkages would lead the conventional import share measure to overstate how much Mexican value 
added is embodied in US cars”.  
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level, knowledge about all value-added trade flows between countries is not required and the 
share of intermediate goods in world trade is a valid proxy for GVC dynamics.17  
The differences between an IIO based measure of GVCs and the share of intermediate 
goods in world trade are depicted in the simplified example of a three-country “global” value 
chain (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Three country “global” value chain example 
 
In our schematic GVC, Country A exports to Country B an intermediate good with a value 
added a, and Country B re-exports this intermediate good to Country C, adding a value 
added b. Country C then incorporates the imported inputs in a final good after adding a value 
added c; a share α of the gross output of the final good is consumed domestically while a 
share (1-α) is exported to Country A.18 
In this schematic GVC, world trade (WT), intermediate goods world trade (IGWT) and world 
trade in value added (VAWT) correspond respectively to: 
WT = XA,B+ XB,C +XC,A = a(3- α)+b(2-α)+c(1- α) 
IGWT = XA,B+ XB,C = 2a+b 
VAWT = a+b+c(1-α) 
                                               
17 Nevertheless, even at country level, intermediate goods trade data capture a high share of a 
country’s GVC activities. E.g., according to an OECD (2013) report, for most economies, on average, 
around one-third of intermediate imports end up in exports. Of course, the differences are large 
between both industries and countries and are linked to the size of the country. In Hungary, nearly 
two-thirds of all intermediate imports are exported compared to 22% in Japan and 17% in the US. In 
the electronics sectors in China, South Korea and Mexico, three-quarters of intermediate imports are 
exported and in Hungary the figure is 85% (OECD, 2013). 
18 The share (1-α) could have been exported to Country B; in the interests of keeping the figure simple 
and since it does not change our indicator values because at the global level we only consider the 
total sum, we do not consider this possibility here. Furthermore, again for simplicity, Country B does 
not use a share of XB,C domestically. Finally, it would have been possible to add values for trade flows 
not embedded in GVCs. 
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A frequently used IIO-based measure of GVCs (Johnson and Noguera, 2017) is the ratio of 
gross to value added world exports, i.e. WT/VAWT.19 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = a(3 −  α) + b(2 − α) + c(1 −  α) a + b + (1 − α)c  
To compute this indicator requires knowledge of a, b and c which is not directly observable 
for all countries and products and, therefore, poses a number of measurement difficulties at 
the world level, especially for GVCs that involve many countries (see above).  
Hence, here, we consider the more easily measured proxy of the share of intermediate 
goods in world trade: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 2a + ba(3 −  α) + b(2 − α) + c(1 −  α) = 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
Such a GVC indicator (computed only from gross trade flows at world level) is directly 
observed and, thus, requires no information on the value added flows, a, b and c.20 This 
measure is both easy to compute and interpret and allows GVCs to be tracked at the global 
level in a simple and transparent manner.  
2. GVCs inter-country input output indicators and intermediate goods trade share 
Studies using IIO-based measures show that GVCs expanded in the 2000s before either 
plateauing or decreasing in more recent years (Aslam et al., 2017; Timmer et al., 2016; 
Haugh et al., 2016, Los et al., 2015). For instance, Timmer and co-authors (2016, p. 30) 
created an indicator of the Global Import Intensity (GII) of production which “measures the 
imports needed in any stage of production”. This indicator is based on world input-output 
tables from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) for 836 final goods21 over the period 
2000-2014. To better identify GVC dynamics, the authors regress GIIs on a set of annual 
dummy variables and country-industry pair dummies. 
Figure 2.A shows the shift in the pattern of international production networks, with a period of 
expansion of the international fragmentation process after 2002 followed by a relative decline 
from 2011. Borin and Mancini (2015, 2017) use a different type of inter-country input-output 
indicator, but find a similar GVC evolution. Their index of GVC participation measures 
“production processes that require at least two international shipments of goods (including 
both intermediate inputs and final products)” (Borin and Mancini, 2017, p. 23);22 in addition, it 
                                               
19 Timmer et al. (2016) point out that this indicator of production fragmentation tracks forward as 
opposed to backward linkages. In our view, this distinction is relevant mainly at the country or bilateral 
level. 
20 Here, a rise in the share α of imported inputs that are not re-exported has a positive impact on 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺_𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺. Conversely, it has a negative impact on 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. It is questionable whether this share of 
imported inputs used for the production of a good sold domestically should have an influence on an 
indicator measuring GVCs intensity at the world level, and which direction is appropriate. 
21 836 GVCs corresponding to 19 manufacturing industries for 44 final destination countries. 
22 “The measure is estimated using bilateral trade data based on the World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD). It excludes the fraction of domestic value added that is exported only once and directly 
absorbed by the destination country. The remaining part of exports is considered part of global value 
chains processes and is divided by total trade of a country or region to obtain the GVC participation 
index. The index is adjusted for commodity price effects by setting to zero valued added in energy 
sectors.” (IRC Trade Task Force, 2016, p. 25). 
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is adjusted to take account of changes to the composition of demand.23 Again, we see GVCs 
expanding during the 2000s and declining from 2011 (see Figure 2.B). Interestingly, as 
recent European Central Bank (ECB), OECD and World Trade Organization (WTO) 
research24 claims, evolution of the trade in intermediate goods and GVCs at the global level 
appears to be similar: Figure 2.B shows that the share of GVCs in total trade (as measured 
by Borin and Mancini, 2017), and the share of intermediate trade in nominal terms, are 
strongly correlated and point to initially increased GVC intensity followed by a fall after 2011. 
Over the period, and at world level, intermediate trade shares seem to carry the same 
information on GVCs as IIO based GVC measures. 
Intermediate trade shares as opposed to IIO based GVC measures could be an alternative 
for analysis of GVC dynamics at world level. 
However, such a measure of GVCs has some limitations. In certain cases, as Hummels et al. 
(2001) point out, the product classification used to distinguish production stages - namely the 
United Nations Broad Economic Categories (BEC) – can be misleading: for example, a car 
embedded in a GVC (i.e., for reexport after some transformation) may be classified as a 
consumption good; conversely, a tyre, classified as an intermediate good, can be sold 
directly to a consumer. However, since the BEC provide a highly disaggregated 
classification, this categorisation problem should be limited in our case: misclassifications are 
likely to cancel each other out when the totality of world trade flows is considered. Moreover, 
this problem is not specific to the share of intermediate goods in world trade since the BEC 
are used, also, to construct data on value-added flows (e.g., WIOD). Another limitation of 
intermediate trade shares is the exclusive coverage of GVCs in goods rather than services 
production (although services incorporated in manufactured goods are included).25  
                                               
23 Borin and Mancini (2017, p. 25) adjust their indicators of GVC-related trade “by ‘neutralizing’ the 
changes in demand composition and using constant prices input-output tables available in the WIOD 
database”. See fn. 27 for a detailed description of their procedure. 
24 IRC Trade Task Force (2016), Haugh et al. (2016) and WTO (2014). 
25 Therefore, it is better adapted to the “second unbundling” rather than the ongoing “third unbundling” 
taking place through remote services (Baldwin, 2016). 
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Figure 2 
Measuring GVCs evolutions 
Inter country input output indicators and intermediate goods trade share 
A. Trend in international fragmentation of goods production 
Global import intensity 
 
Notes: Global Import Intensities (GII) regressions of GVCs 
on dummies for final country-industry and years. The figure 
presents estimated coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals for the year dummies, relative to 2000. The 
observations (11,889) are weighted by final output 
excluding trade in products from the mining industry (WIOD 
Sector 4) and petroleum refining (WIOD sector 10). 
Source: data from Timmer et al. (2016) provided by Marcel 
Timmer. 
B. GVC share of total trade and  
share of intermediate goods in total goods imports (%) 
 
Notes: The GVC participation index is explained in the text. 
Both measures exclude energy-related trade. GVC 
participation is rebased to be equal to the intermediate 
trade share in 2000 and its evolution is calculated based on 
its 2000-2014 growth index. 
Source: data from Borin and Mancini (2017) provided by the 
publication’s authors. 
 
Overall, the share of intermediate goods in global trade in nominal terms is fairly well 
correlated to various GVC indicators based on IIO matrices. It is much less data demanding 
and provides information for both recent years and a longer time span, unlike the irregularly 
published IIO based measures. This world level GVC indicator can also be updated regularly. 
As shown below, another advantage of this measure is the relative ease of obtaining 
deflators at the detailed product level and, therefore, volume calculations. 
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3. Mapping GVCs through intermediate goods trade shares: parts and components 
versus semi-finished products 
In this study, we use detailed trade flows and trade unit values drawn from the World Trade 
Flows Characterization (WTFC) dataset.26 This CEPII dataset provides harmonised unit 
values, categorisation by type of trade (one- and two-way trade) and price-quality ranges of 
bilateral trade flows for more than 230 countries and 5,000 products (HS6) over the period 
2000-2016. It is constructed from two other CEPII databases, TUV (Trade Unit Values) and 
BACI (Base Analytique du Commerce International).27 As Emlinger and Piton (2014) 
suggest, WFTC data have two main advantages: improving data quality and increasing data 
availability. The TUV dataset offers indeed more reliable and consistent unit values than the 
UN COMTRADE database. Furthermore, WTFC is a harmonised version of TUV and the 
harmonisation procedure increases the quality and the number of unit values (see 
Appendix 2 for more details).  
Our study distinguishes different production stages along the GVC. Production stages are 
classified according to their use. Upstream of the production process are primary goods used 
either directly or after processing. Intermediate goods act as inputs to the production process 
and correspond to any manufactured goods that are reintroduced into the production cycle 
and disappear (are transformed) during that cycle. Semi-finished products are subjected to 
further processing while P&C - already ‘finished’ products - are intended for assembly. 
Downstream of the value chain are capital and consumer goods, which are for final use 
respectively by producers and consumers. For our analysis, we consider only the 
manufacturing sector excluding production of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel.28 
Using detailed trade data for the period 2000-2016 from CEPII’s WFTC database, we 
compute trade shares by production stages,29 with the aim, in particular, to distinguish semi-
finished products from P&C within intermediate goods. Separate analysis of these two stages 
among intermediate products might provide additional insights into GVC dynamics since the 
manufacture of P&C (which includes electronics, automotive industry, etc.) corresponds to 
activities more deeply embedded in GVCs than semi-finished goods production (which 
includes chemicals, basic metals, etc.). Yeats (1998), for example, using the trade share of 
P&C, shows that global production sharing increased over the 1978-1995 period. Following 
Baldwin (2016), we go a step further and consider the phenomenon of two-way trade30 as 
indicative of production fragmentation. In Figure 3 high levels of two-way trade flows for 
                                               
26 The Appendix 2 provides a detailed description of the WFTC dataset. 
27 Detailed presentations of TUV and BACI are set out respectively in Berthou and Emlinger (2011) 
and Gaulier and Zignago (2010). 
28 Manufacturing sector groups ISIC 2 digit branches from 15 to 36 (except 23 - coke, refined 
petroleum and nuclear products) and excluding commodities and not elsewhere specified products. 
29 See Appendix 3 for the classification by stages of production, branch groups and branches as well 
as a breakdown of world trade in all products (2000-2016 average, % total). 
30 Following CEPII’s methodology (Emlinger et al., 2016; Fontagné and Freudenberg, 1997), trade at 
the country-partner-product-year level is considered two-way or intra-industry if the value of the 
minority flow (the smallest value between the export and import flows) represents at least 10% of the 
majority flow: 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 ,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘�
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 ,𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � > 10% 𝑤𝑤ith 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  corresponding respectively to exports and imports in 
value from country i to country j for a product k (6-digit level of the Harmonized System classification). 
If the ratio is below this 10% threshold, the flow is considered to be one-way. 
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intermediate products, especially for P&C31, relative to final goods, indicate the international 
segmentation of production.  
Figure 3  
Intermediate goods and two-way trade, 
2000-2016 average, manufacturing trade in value 
A. Share of two-way trade 
(in % of production stage) 
B. Two-way trade 
breakdown 
 by production stages 
(%) 
C. Two-way trade in 
semi-finished goods 
breakdown by industry 
groups (%) 
D. Two-way trade in 
parts & components 
breakdown by industry 
groups (%) 
    
Notes: Intermediate goods include semi-finished products and P&C. One-way and two-way trade are calculated according to the 
CEPII’s methodology (Emlinger et al., 2016; Fontagné and Freudenberg, 1997). Production stages are classified according to 
BEC classification.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
On average, in the 2000-2016 period, P&C recorded the highest share (61%) of two-way 
trade; semi-finished goods achieved 34%, lower than the share of capital and consumption 
goods. The share of P&C in total two-way trade was 32%, compared to 25% for semi-
finished goods. Among industry groups, two-way trade in P&C occurs mainly in electronics, 
transport equipment (automotive sector) and machinery. These industries are the sectors 
typical of the “second unbundling” (Baldwin, 2016). In the case of semi-finished products, 
most two-way trade flows are related to chemicals (48%). Thus, to study GVC dynamics 
requires account to be taken of P&Cs. Since GVCs (and two way trade) tend to be organised 
on a regional basis (Fontagné and Santoni, 2018), Appendix 4 provides a regional 
breakdown of P&C trade32 and highlights the central role of “Factory Asia” in the expansion of 
GVCs. 
The results of our calculations of intermediate trade shares in manufacturing, based on 
detailed trade data for the period 2000-2016, are the same as those derived from IIO based 
measures; a moderate rise in the 2000s then a trend reversal since 2011 (see Figure 4.A). 
Note that growth between 2002 and 2011 (excluding the recession years 2009 and 2010) 
was limited and reached only 2.3%.33 A breakdown of traded goods by production stages 
shows that trends depend strongly on the type of products considered (see Figure 4.B). 
Changes in the share of intermediate trade are due mainly to semi-finished products with the 
share of P&C remaining stable or declining slightly since 2000. 
                                               
31 P&C are more differentiated horizontally and vertically than semi-finished products. 
32 However, Los et al. (2015) point out that regional fragmentation has increased less than global 
fragmentation. 
33 This 4.5% rise (equivalent to 52.9/50.6 – 1) is of a similar magnitude to the level in Timmer et al.  
(2016) (5%) using their GVC indicator (see Figure 2.A).  
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Figure 4 
Share of intermediate goods in world trade for manufacturing  
(at current prices, in %) 
A. Total intermediate goods 
(semi-finished + P&C) 
 
B. Manufacturing world trade breakdown  
by production stages 
 
Note: See Appendix 5 for the share of production stages in total 
world trade at current prices. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
This result might be surprising since P&C and more deeply embedded in GVC production 
activities than semi-finished products. It is possible that use of trade data at current prices 
provides misleading results. The evolution observed is due, in part, to price effects, which 
can have a much stronger impact on semi-finished product trade shares compared to P&C. 
4. Controlling for price effects: trade flow volumes  
The findings for GVCs – derived from intermediate trade shares and IIO based measures – 
could depend on the price treatment. However, gross trade and value added trade flows are 
not normally deflated. Taking account of price effects is important since the production of 
intermediate goods can involve a large share of commodities (especially oil) and, therefore, 
can be affected by variations in energy prices. For instance, as a result of composition 
effects, goods, such as semi-finished products, which undergo fewer transformations, may 
be more strongly affected by commodity price developments than P&C, which represent a 
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more downstream stage of production. Excluding the energy sector to control for such effects 
is not sufficient to remove the impact of commodity prices.34 Also, GVC expansion based on 
increased competition between production sites, exerts a downward pressure on prices that 
needs to be controlled for.35  
To our knowledge, few empirical studies of GVC developments try to control for price 
movements or used deflated series (exceptions include Haugh et al., 2016; Borin and 
Mancini, 2017). To take account of price effects at the detailed international trade data level, 
we compute the deflators by production stages using bilateral trade unit-values (based on 
bilateral trade flows for around 5,000 products). Appendix 6 provides a comprehensive 
description of our methodology and the development of our trade unit value index by 
production stages. Unit values to measure prices might be considered questionable,36 but, as 
Redding and Weinstein (2017, pp. 22-23) emphasize:  
… the coverage of sectors is much wider than in datasets that directly survey prices. 
As a result, many authors—including those working for statistical agencies—advocate 
for greater use of unit value data in the construction of import price indexes. 
Furthermore, existing research comparing aggregate import price indexes constructed 
using unit values and directly surveyed prices finds only small differences between 
them. 
If we compare our deflator to similar indicators, we observe a fairly good match (see 
Appendix 6). 
A large part of the 2002-2011 intermediate goods share increase in world trade at current 
values is linked to price effects. Indeed, calculated with deflated flows, this share remains 
fairly stable throughout the period (excluding 2009 and 2010) and shows no signs of a 
reversing trend in the more recent years (see Figure 5). 
  
                                               
34 See, e.g., IRC Trade Task Force (2016). As explained above, for this reason, in the manufacturing 
sector, we exclude branch 23 (in the ISIC Rev.3 classification) which corresponds to coke, refined 
petroleum products and nuclear fuel. 
35 In Section 6 we show that P&C trade involves a greater diversity of clients and suppliers than other 
stages of production, and that the gap increases over time.  
36 Unit values can be subject of measurement error. However, at the world level, measurement errors 
are less severe since we use a unique deflator, with no country dimension, for each product. We also 
trim the top and bottom 5% of our indicators, which removes any large changes in elementary unit 
values. 
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Figure 5 
Share of intermediate goods 
in world trade for manufacturing in volume  
(at 2011 prices, in %) 
A. Total intermediate goods 
(semi-finished + P&C) 
 
B. Manufacturing world trade breakdown  
by production stages 
 
Note: See Appendix 5 for the share of production stages in total 
world trade in volume. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
A breakdown by production stages is also informative. Again, the results for semi-finished 
products and P&C are different. In the case of the former, much of the growth and 
subsequent fall in current values are linked to price effects. The share of semi-finished goods 
in volume decreased between 2002 (33.7%) and 2006 (32%) and has remained quite flat 
afterwards. In the case of P&C, the share in volume slightly increased between 2002 (20.2%) 
and 2016 (21.4%). It is interesting that, for consumption goods, the share in volume is quite 
flat while, for capital goods, we observe a drop from 21.3% in 2011 to 19.7% in 2016. This 
decrease in the manufacture of capital goods is consistent with reduced demand since the 
Great Recession. 
In the following analysis of GVC dynamics, we focus on the share of P&C in volume. 
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5. GVCs and business cycles 
Following Haugh et al. (2016), we control for cyclical movements. Our GVC indicator, based 
on P&C, is likely to be affected by general economic conditions (see Figure 5.B). In their 
research, Haugh et al. (2016, p. 17) compute an indicator of “backward participation in 
GVCs”, which is based on trade data and corresponds to the ratio of intermediate goods 
imports to final domestic demand,37 in nominal terms, for the 1991-2015 period. To exclude 
commodity prices and cyclical effects, the authors deflate their GVC indicator38 and regress 
the resulting indicator in volume on a measure of the output gap.39 We adopt a similar 
approach: our GVC indicator - share in volume of P&C in world trade for the manufacturing 
industries- is purged of business cycle effects by regressing it on a measure of the output 
gap and a trend (see Appendix 7 for the results of the estimation). 
Both explanatory variables are statistically very significant. The trade share of P&C is higher 
when the world economy is booming with annual average growth of around 0.3% according 
to the trend coefficient. In Figure 6.A, recent GVC evolutions, taking account of price effects 
and business cycle, show no sign of a downturn after the 2008-09 global crisis. 
  
                                               
37 In contrast to trade shares, the denominator of their GVC index, i.e., final domestic demand, 
changes with the country’s GDP (including demand for non-tradable goods). Therefore, an economic 
shock unrelated to GVCs (e.g., trade liberalisation measures at world level) is likely to influence this 
indicator. This does not apply to intermediate trade shares and trade shares by production stages, 
which are independent of any shocks that affect trade flows by production stages and total trade in a 
similar way. For this reason, trade shares might more accurately capture GVC dynamics. 
38 The authors use two different deflators: price of total imports of goods and services to deflate 
imports of intermediate goods, and the deflator for total domestic expenditure concerning final 
domestic demand. However, neither of these deflators has a sectoral dimension, whereas, in our 
methodology, trade unit value deflators are calculated according to production stages. 
39 Their resulting “GVC structural index” (Haugh et al., 2016, pp. 17-18) shows a steady rise since the 
1990s to the 2010. Apart from a slight decline since 2013, the trend reversal of the structural GVC 
index is much less pronounced than the sharp reduction (starting in 2011) in their GVC indicator 
before correcting for price effects and cyclical movements (Haugh et al., 2016, Figure 10, p. 18). 
Therefore, despite differences in the methods used (and the results), Haugh et al. (2016) also find a 
major influence of commodity prices and business cycle. 
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Figure 6 
Actual and adjusted shares  
of Parts & Components in volume  
(at 2011 prices, in % of manufacturing world trade) 
A. All Parts & Components 
 
B. P&C excluding 
“Office machinery & Computers” (ISIC 30) 
 
Note: Adjusted share is the fit of the regression of the P&C share in 
volume on a linear trend and an output gap from IMF-WEO 
database (see Appendix 7). 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
6. GVCs and sectoral developments 
Finally, we investigate whether sectoral composition effects played a role in the evolution of 
the trade share in volume of P&C. Is the share of world trade in industries where this stage of 
production is significant higher in 2016 compared to 2000? Or, does the share of P&C 
increase within industries?  
Figure 7A depicts the evolution in world manufacturing trade in volume by branch groups. In 
the medium term, trade shares were relatively stable, particularly for branch groups involved 
in P&C trade. In this production stage, over the period considered, four branch groups 
account for more than 96% of world trade in P&C (see Figure 7.B) with electronics 
accounting for 40% of P&C trade in 2016. Transport equipment represented 26% of P&C 
trade followed by machinery 18% and electrical machinery 12% in 2016. Thus, there is no 
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evidence of a sectoral composition effect on P&C trade shares. At this level of aggregation, 
we observe no major changes and the rise in the P&C trade share in volume is not, as might 
have been expected, linked to expansion of the electronics industry. 
Figure 7.C shows that, within these four main branch groups, P&C trade shares remained 
stable (in the case of machinery and electronics) or grew slightly (electrical machinery and 
transport equipment) throughout the period, with no sign of a slowdown after the Great 
Recession. In contrast, starting in 2009 in the case of transport equipment and 2011 in the 
case of electronics, there was an upturn after the 2008-09 global crisis. 
Figure 7 
World manufacturing trade in volume by branch groups and zoom on P&C 
A. World manufacturing sector breakdown by branch groups 
(all production stages, %) 
 
B. Main branch groups in P&C: 
share in the P&C world trade (%) 
C. Main branch groups in P&C: 
share of P&C in each branch group’s trade (%) 
  
 
Notes: See Figure A.6 in Appendix 8 for trade shares in value. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database 
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Figure 8 
World trade in electronics in volume  
(in % of world manufacturing trade) 
A. ISIC branches in electronics  
(all production stages) 
B. ISIC branches in electronics 
detailed by production stages 
  
Notes: In panel A HS6 products are regrouped in branches according to 2 digit ISIC classification: ISIC 30 (Office machinery & 
computers), 32 (Radio, TV & communication equipment) and 33 (Medical, precision & optical instruments). In panel B, these three 
branches are detailed by production stages: SF, semi-finished goods; PC, P&C; K, capital goods; and C, consumption goods. See 
Figure A.7 in Appendix 8 for trade shares in value. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
Given the high share of electronic products in P&C trade flows, we explore this sector in 
more detail, according to branches and production stages. Figure 8.A shows that global 
stability in electronics is hiding some major changes among branches. Trade shares in 
volume for telecommunications equipment and precision and medical instruments increased, 
but decreased in the case of the share of office machinery and computers in world 
manufacturing trade. These changes are not linked to price effects since similar evolutions 
are observed in trade shares at current prices (see Appendix 8). In the case of office 
machinery and computers, the decline is even more pronounced in current prices: -3.4 (from 
7.4% to 4%) versus -3.2 (from 6.6% to 3.4%) in volume. Consistent with the smaller increase 
in the prices of precision and medical instruments, trade shares in volume in this subsector 
exhibited a higher increase over the period: 1.3 (from 3.3% to 4.6%) compared to 1.1 in 
value (from 3.9% to 5%). For telecommunications equipment, the slight decrease in the trade 
share in value (-0.9, from 12.1% to 11.2%) becomes a slight increase in volume (+0.5, from 
9.6% to 11.1%). 
A breakdown by production stages indicates that the decline in the trade share of office 
machinery and computers was linked to a major decrease in P&C and a more modest 
decrease in capital goods (see Figure 8.B). Similarly, the rise in telecommunications 
equipment was driven by P&C growth, and capital goods growth was responsible for the 
increase in precision and medical instruments. 
These changes are linked, in part, to a structural transformation of the electronics sector 
where the development of telecommunications equipment activities has occurred in parallel 
with a decrease in the more mature office machinery and computer sectors.  
In light of these findings, we re-ran the regressions for share in volume of P&C in world trade, 
but excluding office machinery and computers (see Figure 6.B) which accounted for a high 
share of P&C trade in the electronics industry in 2000 (35% in volume compared to 11% in 
2016). This subsector includes a diversity of goods and is characterized by rapid 
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technological change, which increases the relevance of classification and measurement 
issues.40 As expected, our GVC indicator shows a greater increase when office machinery 
and computers are excluded. 
7. GVCs at the extensive margin 
More qualitative data on the number of international “links” in production networks allow for 
more in-depth analysis of GVCs and production stages. Johnson (2017) suggests that the 
number of links in the GVC can be used to study GVC organization, length, position of 
industries in the value chain and degree of fragmentation. Johnson (2017) refers to Fally 
(2012) and Antràs and Chor (2013) who count the number of production stages. Another 
“qualitative” count statistic in the context of GVCs is growth in the variety of products. 
Papageorgiou and Spatafora (2012), for the case of Vietnam, find an 18-fold rise in the 
number of products exported between 1990 and 2010. Other studies measure varieties gains 
by incorporating growth in the number of varieties in price measures (Feenstra, 1994; 
Feenstra and Weinstein, 2017). 
In the present study, data on the number of clients by exporter, and the number of suppliers 
by importer, are used to measure geographic diversity along GVCs and the expansion of 
trade at the extensive margin. A client (respectively a supplier) of an exporter (respectively 
importer) is a destination (respectively origin) country for a given product. Figure 9 presents 
numbers and equivalent numbers by production stages, of clients per exporter and suppliers 
per importer. Average values are computed for countries and products at the 6-digit HS level 
for manufacturing world trade and for each year in our period of analysis (2000-2016).41 
Since absolute numbers treat two clients (or suppliers) representing, respectively, 1/10000th 
and 10% of sales (or purchases) similarly, we also calculate equivalent numbers to obtain 
further information on the geographic concentration of sales and supply.42 Since equivalent 
numbers give higher weights to larger partners, they are an appropriate statistical indicator to 
measure diversity in a context of highly heterogeneous country sizes (e.g., the Kiribati 
Islands compared to Japan).43 
                                               
40 Due to an insufficient level of detail in the product classifications, some items have a strong effect on 
aggregates. For instance, HS 847330 “parts and accessories of data processing equipment not 
elsewhere specified” contributes a great deal to the decline of the P&C trade share in volume for office 
machinery and computers, due to both its declining values and rising unit values. 
41Note that our measures may underestimate growth at the extensive margin since they do not 
consider the numbers of clients and suppliers in a country. 
42The following example shows how equivalent numbers measure partner diversity. If a country has 
two clients, each accounting for 50% of export sales, the equivalent number is 2. If a country has 11 
clients and one of them accounts for 90% of export sales and the other ten each account for 1%, the 
equivalent number is 1.2. To find equivalent numbers, we consider simple average values although 
weighted averages (or medians) can also be calculated. Appendix 9 presents weighted equivalent 
numbers for manufacturing world trade, using trade at the 6-digit HS level as the weight (average over 
2000-2016). It also provides the numbers for all world trade products. 
43 However, using this indicator (as well as absolute numbers), replacing two suppliers, one in Italy 
and one in Germany, by four suppliers in China, reduces diversity. Therefore, this indicator cannot 
capture firm diversification within a single country. However, considering the high level of 
concentration of trade among firms at country level, this might not be too much of a problem. Also, our 
focus is on international, not national fragmentation of the production process. 
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We observe, first, that the number of international links is increasing, and this applies to each 
production stage.44 Also, apart from a slight slowdown between 2008 and 2012, we find no 
evidence of weaker growth in geographic diversification since the Great Recession. It is 
interesting that the greatest geographic diversity is in P&C – based on either numbers or 
equivalent numbers, for both clients and suppliers. In contrast, despite an increase since 
2000, the lowest values are for semi-finished products. So P&C trades involves more 
countries and more border crossings and geographic diversification, and has been rising 
steadily while diversification in semi-finished products has remained almost unchanged. Also 
noteworthy is the high level of geographic diversification on the import side in the case of 
P&C, regardless of which indicator is used.45 This might reflect a GVC organisation where 
firms source inputs from across the world, but sell output to a limited number of destinations. 
For example, a Mexican subcontractor of a German carmaker may buy inputs from 
numerous suppliers, but sell its output exclusively to the US.46 In addition, in the context of 
imports, the flat slopes of the curves of the equivalent numbers for semi-finished products 
and consumption goods indicate that new suppliers are of small size. It is significant that the 
gap between the two types of intermediate products is increasing up to 2014.47 Figure 10 
shows that semi-finished products decline according to all the indicators whereas P&C show 
increased supplier diversity. For clients, P&C show similar dynamics to finished goods. All 
producers, including P&C producers, require a high and increasing diversity of suppliers. 
However, once the parts are combined into a product, the number of clients is no higher for 
P&C. Diversified supply of inputs is crucial for monopolistic firms selling a specific variety, 
whereas (geographical) diversification of sales entails fixed costs related to each destination, 
which, especially for small and medium sized firms, can reduce the benefits deriving from 
economies of scale. 
  
                                               
44 Note that the increase in our indicators cannot be due to the emergence of new countries or new 
products since our calculations are based only on countries and products available in each of the 
years in the 2000-2016 period. It implies that, during our period of analysis starting in 2000, there were 
very few withdrawals of products or countries.  
45 In the case of imports, using weighted equivalent numbers leads to the same result (see 
Appendix 9). In the case of exports, equivalent numbers are more similar for P&C and capital goods. 
46 Supplier diversity at the country level stems from both the number of suppliers of a representative 
firm and the number of firms, each of which will have preferred suppliers. 
47 The figures for years 2015 and 2016 should be interpreted with caution since these recent data may 
not be exhaustive and are subject to revision (due, in particular, to missing data for some countries in 
recent releases). Therefore, the slight decline observed in our indicators for these two years could be 
attributable to statistical issues as well as the relative weakness of Asian trade and cyclical factors. 
Further research will be needed to study the more recent evolutions.  
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Figure 9 
Clients and suppliers diversity:  
average values levels by production stages in manufacturing world trade  
(calculated by countries and products at the 6-digit HS level) 
A. CLIENTS BY EXPORTER B. SUPPLIERS BY IMPORTER 
Number 
  
Equivalent number 
  
 
Notes: Equivalent numbers are computed for each country and product at the 6-digit HS level according to the 
following formula: 1 / (Σclients or suppliers (Market shares)2). The market share of a client (a supplier) is the share in 
total exports (imports) of this client (supplier). Calculations are made only for countries and products available 
for each year of the 2000-2016 period. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
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Figure 10 
Clients and suppliers diversity:  
average value indices by production stages in manufacturing world trade  
(calculated by countries and products at the 6-digit HS level, 2000=1) 
A. CLIENTS BY EXPORTER B. SUPPLIERS BY IMPORTER 
Number 
  
Equivalent number 
  
 
Notes: Equivalent numbers are computed for each country and product at the 6-digit HS level according to the 
following formula: 1 / (Σclients or suppliers (Market shares)2). The market share of a client (a supplier) is the share in 
total exports (imports) of this client (supplier). Calculations are made only for countries and products available 
for each year of the 2000-2016 period. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
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8. Conclusion 
This working paper provided an in-depth examination of GVC dynamics at world level since 
the 2000s. We used very detailed trade data for the period 2000 to 2016, distinguishing 
different production stages along the GVC. We focused on P&C trade flows which capture 
GVC dynamics better than total intermediate goods. We took account of price effects by 
constructing an original deflator by production stages. Price fluctuations shape trade share 
dynamics to varying extents in the downstream and upstream stages. We controlled, also, for 
the global business cycle given the heterogeneous degrees of procyclicality across 
production stages. 
Our findings are as follows: 
Our GVC indicator, namely share in volume of P&C in manufacturing trade, was on a 
slightly upward trend over the period and showed no sign of reversal in the most recent 
years. These dynamics are not the result of a sectoral composition effect. 
In the electronics sector, where GVCs are particularly developed, we observed 
contrasting developments: the share in P&C trade for office machinery and computers 
decreased, but increased for telecommunications equipment, the IT revolution flagship 
industry. 
Counts of clients or suppliers by stages of production also indicate a higher and 
growing geographical diversity for P&C. 
GVCs will remain at the centre of future economic debates and, especially, in the context of 
the recent protectionist tensions and regional disintegration pressures in NAFTA and the EU. 
It is clear that a sound understanding of GVC evolutions and reliable and up-to-date 
measures of this phenomenon are crucial for analyses of the globalization process. 
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9. Appendices 
Appendix 1 Results from a Google Scholar search of GVCs 
Figure A.1 Results from a Google Scholar search of 
“global value chains”, 1980–2017 
 
Notes: Number of entries as a result of a Google Scholar search of the exact phrase “global value 
chains”. Search conducted on 23 May 2018 (logarithmic scale). 
Source: https://scholar.google.fr/  
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Appendix 2 Construction of WTFC database from TUV and BACI databases 
The TUV relies on Tariff lines data, provided by the United Nations Statistical Division and 
provide raw information on trade values and quantities as reported by the declaring 
countries, for 173 reporters and 255 partner countries. Each country declares both imports 
(CIF) and exports (FOB). Raw declarations do not allow for international comparative 
analyses: quantity units, thresholds and levels of aggregation vary according to the 
reporter. Data are processed in order to provide reliable and comparable unit values 
across countries. First, all quantity units are converted into weights, using conversion 
factors computed from UN COMTRADE mirror flows (quantities declared in different units 
by the exporter and the importer provide empirical conversion). Second, extreme unit 
values are detected using the cross-sectional and the time dimensions of the data. Third, 
unit values are computed as the ratio of values on quantities. Finally, unit values (in US 
dollars per ton) are aggregated at the HS6-digit level. We end up with a worldwide unit 
values database, covering 182 reporters, 253 partners, and more than 5,000 product 
categories.  (Emlinger and Piton, 2014, p. 2) 
[WTFC]… harmonize the Trade Unit Values database following BACI methodology. 
Harmonization takes advantage of the double information for each flow we have in the 
Trade Unit Values database, comparing import unit values (relying on importers’ 
declarations) and export unit values (relying on exporters’ declarations) for the same flow 
(i.e. mirror flows). TUV harmonization raises two concerns. First, as import unit values are 
reported including all trade costs (except tariffs and domestic taxes after the border) while 
exports are reported FOB (free on board), we cannot directly compare exporters’ and 
importers’ declarations. We thus use CIF (cost of insurance and freight) rates estimates of 
BACI to compute FOB import unit values. Second, as all country reports do not have the 
same accuracy, a criterion to average the FOB-FOB mirror numbers is needed. We use 
the reliability of each country provided by BACI to weight and reconcile each mirror trade 
flow. In BACI, the reliability of countries’ report is evaluated by computing an indicator of 
the reporting distance among partners (the absolute value of the natural log of the ratio of 
mirror flows). This indicator is then decomposed using a (weighted) variance analysis. The 
relative reliability of country reporting is then cleaned from the effects of its geographical 
and sectoral specialization. (Emlinger and Piton, 2014, p.3) 
The interest of using the World Trade Flows Characterization (WTFC), this harmonized 
version of the TUV is twofold. First, using TUV database improves the quality and offers 
more reliable and consistent unit values than the UN COMTRADE database, the latter 
suffering from biases in the computation of unit values. Indeed, the treatment of countries’ 
reports by UN Statistical Division in case of missing information regarding quantities 
reduces the variance of unit values observed: missing weights are estimated using the 
mean unit value recorded for the same reporter and product category or, when it is not 
possible, using a standard unit value computed at the world level. In this latter case, all 
countries are assumed to share the same price for a given HS6-digit product category, 
that leads to smaller unit values variance for this product. As a consequence, in BACI 
database (which results from the harmonization of the UN COMTRADE database), 63% of 
world trade corresponds to unit values in the median quartile, whereas it is 57% in the 
harmonized version of TUV. Second, the harmonization of TUV increases the quantity of 
unit values documented and increases the coverage of our database, benefiting from the 
double information for each flow we have in TUV as stated previously. This harmonization 
compensates for one of TUV’s main setback, which is that using raw data decreases the 
number of documented unit values: TUV database only covers 79% of the flows existing 
in the UN COMTRADE database on average. (Emlinger and Piton, 2014, p.3) 
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Appendix 3 Classifications by stages of production, branch groups and branches 
Table A.1 
Classification by production stages 
Production stages  Code BEC* BEC Name 
 111 Food and beverages, primary, mainly for industry 
Primary products 21 Industrial supplies n.e.s., primary 
 31 Fuels and lubricants, primary 
 121 Food and beverages, processed, mainly for industry 
Semi-finished products 22 Industrial supplies n.e.s., processed 
 322 Fuels and lubricants, processed 
Parts & components 42 Of capital goods, except transport equipment 
 53 Of transport equipment 
Capital goods 41 Capital goods except transport equipment 
 521 Other industrial transport equipment 
 112 Food & bev., primary, mainly for household consumption 
 122 Food & bev., primary, processed, for house. consumption 
 51 Passenger motor cars 
Consumption goods 522 Other non-industrial transport equipment 
 61 Durable consumer goods n.e.s. 
 62 Semi-durable consumer goods n.e.s. 
 63 Non-durable consumer goods n.e.s. 
* Broad Economic Categories of the United Nations. 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry). 
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Table A.2 
World trade breakdown by branch groups, branches and production stages  
(trade in value, all products, average 2000-2016, in % of total) 
 Production stages (BEC groupings) 
 Commodities Semi-
finished 
P&C Consumption Capital NEC Total 
Branch group / ISIC Rev. 3 branch               
TOTAL 13,5 29,3 16,7 22,1 16,8 1,5 100,0 
Energy 9,2 5,5 
    
14,7 
10 Mining of coal & lignite 0,6 0,0 
    
0,6 
11 Extraction of crude petroleum & natural gas 8,6 0,6 
    
9,2 
12 Mining of uranium & thorium ores 0,0 
     
0,0 
23 Coke, refined petroleum & nuclear fuel 0,0 4,6 
  
0,0 
 
4,6 
40 Electricity, gas, steam & hot water supply 0,0 0,2 
    
0,2 
Agriculture & Food 1,9 1,2 
 
5,2 0,0 
 
8,4 
01 Agriculture, hunting 1,6 0,0 
 
1,0 0,0 
 
2,6 
02 Forestry, logging 0,1 0,0 
    
0,2 
05 Fishing, fish farming 0,0 
  
0,1 
  
0,2 
15 Food products & beverages 0,1 1,2 
 
3,9 
  
5,2 
16 Tobacco products 
   
0,2 
  
0,2 
Textiles 0,0 1,4 0,0 4,0 
 
0,0 5,5 
17 Textiles 0,0 1,2 0,0 1,1 
 
0,0 2,3 
18 Wearing apparel 
 
0,0 
 
2,0 
  
2,0 
19 Leather 
 
0,2 0,0 1,0 
  
1,2 
Wood Paper 0,1 2,8 0,0 2,3 0,3 0,0 5,6 
20 Wood products 0,0 0,7 
 
0,0 
  
0,8 
21 Pulp, paper & paper products 0,1 1,2 
 
0,2 
  
1,4 
22 Publishing, printing & recorded media 
 
0,1 0,0 0,4 
  
0,5 
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0,0 0,8 0,0 1,7 0,3 0,0 2,9 
Chemicals 0,6 10,6 0,5 3,8 
  
15,4 
14 Other mining & quarrying 0,5 
     
0,5 
2410 Basic chemical products  0,0 5,2 
    
5,2 
2423 Pharmaceutical products  
 
1,3 
 
2,0 
  
3,3 
24xx Other chemical products 
 
1,8 
 
1,0 
  
2,8 
25 Rubber & plastic  0,0 1,2 0,5 0,7 
  
2,5 
26 Non-metallic mineral products  0,0 1,0 0,0 0,1 
  
1,1 
Metallurgy 1,6 5,2 
    
6,8 
13 Mining of metal ores 1,5 
     
1,5 
27 Basic metals 0,1 5,2 
    
5,3 
Machinery 
 
1,6 3,2 0,9 4,6 0,1 10,3 
28 Metal products 
 
1,5 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,0 2,2 
29 Machinery 
 
0,1 2,9 0,7 4,4 0,1 8,1 
Electrical machinery 
 
0,7 2,0 0,1 1,3 
 
4,0 
31 Electrical machinery 
 
0,7 2,0 0,1 1,3 
 
4,0 
Electronics 
 
0,3 6,8 1,2 7,5 
 
15,8 
30 Office machinery & computers 
  
1,4 0,0 2,5 
 
3,9 
32 Radio, TV & communication equipment 
  
5,0 0,6 2,7 
 
8,4 
33 Medical, precision & optical instruments 
 
0,3 0,3 0,6 2,3 
 
3,5 
Transport equipment 0,0 
 
4,2 4,5 3,1 0,0 11,8 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers 
  
3,0 4,3 1,2 
 
8,5 
35 Other transport equipment 0,0 
 
1,2 0,3 1,9 0,0 3,4 
Non elsewhere classified (NEC) 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,4 1,6 
74 Other business activities 
 
0,0 
    
0,0 
92 Recreational, cultural & sporting activities 
 
0,1 
 
0,0 
  
0,1 
93 Other service activities 0,0 
     
0,0 
XX Other NEC 
     
1,4 1,4 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
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Appendix 4 GVCs and regional trade integration 
Since international production networks are frequently organised on a regional basis, GVCs 
tend to be mainly regional value chains (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013; Cingolani et al., 
2018; Degain et al., 2017; Pomfret and Sourdin, 2018). In this appendix, we examine 
intraregional and interregional trade shares for P&C. Figure A.2 provides a geographical 
breakdown of world trade in P&C, distinguishing the three major regional production 
networks and the rest of the world. Intra- and extra-zone trade flows are detailed for NAFTA, 
the EU-28 and Factory Asia. The strongest GVC expansion occurred in intra-Factory Asia. In 
2000, it represented 19% of P&C world trade and reached 30% in 2016, compared to 22% 
and 19% for intra-EU. The intra-NAFTA share declined sharply (14% in 2000 and 8% in 
2016). This fall might be linked to the lack of trade integration deepening in NAFTA over the 
period studied,48 whereas the monetary union and the enlargements towards Central and 
Eastern Europe further integrated the EU. In the context of Factory Asia, trade integration 
began to catch up after 2000 based on the signing of numerous trade agreements (Hofmann 
et al., 2017). Johnson and Noguera (2017) and Laget et al. (2018) show that deeper trade 
integration is associated to GVC expansion, while Fontagné and Santoni (2018) point to a 
reverse causality of GVCs and the propensity to sign trade agreements. Hofmann et al. 
(2018, p. 25) suggest that “The increase in average depth of PTAs over time goes together 
with the increase in trade of parts and components in the world”.  
Figure A.2  
Geographical breakdown of the world P&C trade: 
NAFTA―EU28―Factory Asia―Rest of the world  
(with the detail of intra- and extra-zone trade flows, in % of the world P&C trade in value) 
A. Exports B. Imports 
  
 
Notes: By construction, intra-regional shares are the same for exports and imports. The Factory Asia region regroups ASEAN member 
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Cambodia) and China, India, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
                                               
48 Dollar depreciation vis-à-vis the euro may have contributed to this evolution. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
Appendix 5 World trade breakdown by production stages in all products (value & 
volume) 
Figure A.3  
World trade breakdown by production stages in all products  
A. In value (%) 
 
B. In volume (at 2011 unit values, %) 
 
* Intermediate goods= semi-finished products + P&C. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
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Appendix 6 Unit value indices calculation 
• Trade data come from the WTFC dataset (see Appendix 2). 
• Logarithmic changes in unit-value (value in USD divided by quantity in tons) are 
computed for each elementary trade flow (i.e. an exporter i, an importer j, a product 
hs6 and a year t). 
• To exclude outliers, the top and bottom 5% logarithmic change (dlog) are dropped, for 
each product and each year. 
• These logarithmic changes in unit-value (dlog) at the 6-digit HS level (around 5,000 
products) are aggregated from the bilateral to the world level, using a Tornqvist price-
index formula: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡)
𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖  
where 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡 = 12 ∗ ( 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡−1∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡−1𝑀𝑀,𝑖𝑖 ) 
(i.e., simple average of the elementary trade flow share in world trade of the specific product 
at time t and t-1) 
The same formula is used to aggregate at the sectoral level (stage of production, industry, 
industry×stage, total world trade, etc.). For instance, in the case of production stages (using 
the United Nations Broad Economic Categories):  
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡
ℎ𝑠𝑠6 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏  
where: 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑ℎ𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡 = 12 ∗ ( 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡)  ℎ𝑠𝑠6 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡−1∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 ℎ𝑠𝑠6,𝑡𝑡−1)  ℎ𝑠𝑠6 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 ) 
• In the case that the 6-digit unit value are unknown, we use an index at the 4-digit 
level, or 2-digit if the 4-digit unit value are unknown; 
• Tbec,t series are computed from dlogTbec,t with 2011 as the base year (Ths6,2011=1); 
• “Volumes” are 𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑤𝑤 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡⁄ . 
Deflators and trade in volume can be computed at any level of aggregation.49 Trade unit 
value indices by production stages are presented in Figure A.4: after commodities, semi-
finished products are the stage of production most affected by price variations, P&C being 
the least affected. 
                                               
49 Note that, the calculation of our deflators, leads to a difference between the sum of trade in volume 
by production stages and total trade volume. This problem is related to the use of chained weighted 
methodologies, which minimizes substitution bias, but are not additive. For a more detailed 
explanation, based on US data, see https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aip/priceadj.html. 
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Figure A.4  
Trade unit value indices by production stages  
(2000=1, world trade, all products) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
If we compare our trade unit value index to other unit value and price indices (Figure A.5), 
the index matches fairly well. Pooling all products, we can match the world price series 
provided by CPB in World Trade Monitor and UNCTAD’s unit value export index (and, to a 
lesser extent, UNCTAD’s unit value imports index), which is reassuring. The differences 
between the WDI CPI and WDI GDP deflators are linked to the inclusion of services in these 
price indicators. 
Figure A.5  
World trade unit value (UV), consumer price (CPI)  
and GDP’s price indices  
(2011=1) 
  
Source: authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC data base, CPB World Trade 
Monitor, UNCTAD-STAT, and Word Bank-World development indicators. 
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Appendix 7 GVCs and business cycles 
Table A.3 
1. Dependent Variable: Trade share of all parts and components (LOG) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
WORLD OUTPUT GAP 0,010 0,003 3,698 0,002 
TREND 0,003 0,001 4,059 0,001 
Intercept -1,589 0,006 -264,906 0,000 
     R-squared 0,609 Mean dependent var -1,569
Adjusted R-squared 0,553  S.D. dependent var 0,019 
S.E. of regression 0,012  Akaike info criterion -5,772 
Sum squared resid 0,002  Schwarz criterion -5,625 
Log likelihood 52,064  Hannan-Quinn criter. -5,758 
F-statistic 10,895  Durbin-Watson stat 2,794 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,001 
   
2. Dependent Variable: 
Trade share of P&C excluding “Office machinery & Computers” - ISIC 30 (LOG) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
WORLD OUTPUT GAP 0,011 0,003 3,409 0,004 
TREND 0,009 0,001 10,999 0,000 
Intercept -1,688 0,007 -238,377 0,000 
 
    
R-squared 0,897  Mean dependent var -1,620 
Adjusted R-squared 0,882  S.D. dependent var 0,043 
S.E. of regression 0,015  Akaike info criterion -5,440 
Sum squared resid 0,003  Schwarz criterion -5,293 
Log likelihood 49,238  Hannan-Quinn criter. -5,425 
F-statistic 60,919  Durbin-Watson stat 2,308 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,000    
Notes: Least squares method, 17 observations. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database and IMF (2017, variable world output gap). 
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Appendix 8 Sectoral evolutions 
Figure A.6 
World manufacturing trade in value by branch groups and zoom on P&C 
A. World manufacturing sector breakdown by branch groups 
(all production stages, %) 
 
B. Main branch groups in P&C: 
share in the P&C world trade (%) 
C. Main branch groups in P&C: 
share of P&C in each branch group’s trade (%) 
  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database 
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Figure A.7  
World trade in electronics in value  
(in % of world manufacturing trade) 
A. ISIC branches in electronics  
(all production stages) 
B. ISIC branches in electronics 
detailed by production stages 
  
Notes: In panel A HS6 products are regrouped in branches according to 2 digit ISIC classification: ISIC 30 (Office machinery & 
computers), 32 (Radio, TV & communication equipment) and 33 (Medical, precision & optical instruments). In panel B, these three 
branches are detailed by production stages: SF, semi-finished goods; PC, P & C; K, capital goods; and C, consumption goods. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database. 
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Appendix 9 Two supplementary indicators on clients and suppliers diversity 
Figure A.8 
Clients and suppliers diversity in world trade: 
average values by production stages, 2000-2016  
(calculated by countries and products at the 6-digit HS level) 
A. CLIENTS BY EXPORTER B. SUPPLIERS BY IMPORTER 
Number in all products 
  
Weighted equivalent number in manufacturing world trade 
  
 
Notes: Weighted equivalent numbers are computed for each country and product at the 6-digit 
HS level according to the following formula: 1 / (Σclients or suppliers (Market shares)2). Weights 
correspond to hs6 trade (average over 2000-2016). Calculations are made only for countries 
and products available for each year of the 2000-2016 period. 
Source : Authors’ calculations from CEPII’s WTFC database.  
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